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DOES TRADE TRUMP LAW IN THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS? INTERNATIONAL TRADE, LAW, AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
SOUTH AFRICA AND SOUTH KOREA 
International relations have become categorically dependent on the sophisticated 
trading systems that interconnect and empower sovereign states. Thus, a state’s 
focus on protecting the rights of its individuals comprising and affected by that 
system would appear to come secondary to the economic decisions involved in 
conducting trade agreements. This article asks whether the international trade 
regime can be used to further the protection of human rights or whether such 
protection should be better left in the hands of legal entities in international bodies 
and sovereign states. I analyze South Korea and South Africa’s legal and trade 
regimes—two of the world’s largest and most integrated economies and two 
countries with remarkably different development histories—to underscore the 
responsibility of governments in their international transactions and domestic 
relations and to outline the future role and mandate of the world’s most 
significant international institutions. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On November 16, 2015, in Geneva, Switzerland, the 
United Nations held its annual three-day “Forum on Business 
and Human Rights” that brought together over 2,000 
participants from all over the world—including executives of 
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international business organizations, government officials, 
experts in trade, nongovernmental organizations, and 
interested third parties—to discuss the intersection of 
business and human rights.1 The goal of the forum was to 
tease out how the respect of human rights could become 
“fashionable” in the business world. According to Arancha 
Gonzalez, Executive Director of the International Trade 
Centre, “fashion [itself] can be a means to address human 
rights.”2 Across the world in New York City, a few months 
before the forum, Pope Francis declared that “[e]conomic and 
social exclusion is a complete denial of human fraternity and 
a grave offense against human rights”.3 These two events 
echo growing sentiment in recent years that human rights, 
though theoretically respected in serious international 
agreements, are continuously threatened by the pace and 
depth of globalization. 
All of the players gathered at the United Nations 
conference interact on the stage of the international political 
economy, the integrated international system of economics 
that is categorically propelled by the politics of the countries 
who interact in the business world. Given that the 
international political economy is inherently driven by 
economic theories of interest and comparative advantage, it 
and the actors interacting in it (that is, trading with one 
                                                 
 
 
1 Making Human Rights Fashionable, U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R 
(Nov._19,_2015),_http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/Mak
inghumanrightsfashionable.aspx.  
2 Id.  
3 Pope Francis, Meeting with the Members of the General Assembly of the 
United Nations Organization: Address of the Holy Father, THE HOLY SEE 
(Sept._25,_2015),_http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches
/2015/september/documents/papa-francesco_20150925_onu-visita.pdf.  
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another) have facilitated the creation of winners and losers in 
the system: parties who either benefit greatly or lose greatly 
from these interactions. Human rights often tend to be the 
biggest loser in this system. 
A case-in-point that demonstrates the vulnerability of 
the human actors who perpetuate the existence of the 
international political economy would be the 2013 disaster at 
Rana Plaza in Bangladesh.4 Rana Plaza was one of the largest 
clothing factories operating in Bangladesh, in which fashion 
brands such as Benetton, El Corte Inglés, Mango, and 
Walmart manufactured merchandise for their stores around 
the world.5 The building collapsed in April 2013 due to 
structural inadequacies, a lack of appropriate surveillance 
and inspection, overcrowding, and overworking: “poor 
                                                 
 
 
4 Jason Burke, Bangladesh Factory Collapse Leaves Trail of Shattered Lives, THE 
GUARDIAN_(June_6,_2013),_http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013
/jun/06/bangladesh-factory-building-collapse-community.  
5 See Clare O’Connor, “Extreme Pricing” At What Cost? Retailer Joe Fresh 
Sends Reps to Bangladesh as Death Toll Rises, FORBES (Apr. 30, 2013), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/clareoconnor/2013/04/30/extreme-
pricing-at-what-cost-retailer-joe-fresh-sends-reps-to-bangladesh-as-
death-toll-rises/#6b7cc3825b83; Steven Greenhouse, Major Retailers Join 
Bangladesh_Safety_Plan,_N.Y._TIMES_(May_13,_2013),_http://www.nyti
mes.com/2013/05/14/business/global/hm-agrees-to-bangladesh-
safety-plan.html; Steve Robson, Miracle Survivor of Bangladesh Factory 
Collapse Changed into Clothes of Her Dead Colleague Before Being Rescued: 19-
Year-Old who Lived off Water from Dripping Pipe for 17 Days Emerged from 
Ruins in a Mauve Wrap and Pink Scarf, DAILYMAIL.COM (May 
10,_2013),_http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
2322391/Bangladesh-survivor-Reshma-Akhter-changed-dead-
colleagues-clothes-trapped-rubble.html; and Steven Greenhouse, As Firms 
Line Up on Factories, Wal-Mart Plans Solo Effort, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/15/business/six-retailers-join-
bangladesh-factory-pact.html?pagewanted=all.  
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construction and a lack of oversight.”6 More importantly, it 
was, in some ways, the result of “a growing global desire for 
more cheap fashion” to profit the big companies.7 The more 
workers could be crammed into a building, and the less the 
building needed to be inspected for building code violations, 
and the less the machines and humans working them needed 
to stop working for improvements to the building structure, 
the more big businesses profited from cheap labor in selling 
cheap fashion. Though progress has been made to improve 
factory conditions in all of Bangladesh over the past four 
years, there is still much room to improve the whole of the 
garment industry in general. This includes simply reforming 
the structures of factories, but more importantly, reform 
involves pushing responsibility for human rights onto both 
small and large players in trade. More broadly, this highlights 
the critical role that economics, trade, and law can play in the 
protection against human rights violations all over the world. 
The World Trade Organization (“WTO”) is, today, the 
mammoth international body for matters of trade, economic 
relations, and the international political economy. It was 
established in 1994, following the Uruguay Round 
negotiations of the previous international institution for 
international trade, the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade. The Marrakesh Agreement that established the WTO 
states in its preamble that the parties to the agreement 
(members of the WTO) recognize “that their relations in the 
                                                 
 
 
6 Amy Westervelt, Two Years after Rana Plaza, Have Conditions Improved in 
Bangladesh’s Factories?, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 24, 2015), 
http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-
business/2015/apr/24/bangladesh-factories-building-collapse-garment-
dhaka-rana-plaza-brands-hm-gap-workers-construction.  
7 Id. 
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field of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted 
with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full 
employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real 
income.”8 Some success has been met in this endeavor. More 
generally however, the success of the WTO in general in 
subsequent years has ushered in an era where consumers are 
conscience of the international reach that their purchases have 
and of the extent to which their currency helps the employees 
of the biggest businesses in the world. Consumers are 
motivated to demand fair and free trade.9 Quite simply then, 
one can venture to say that the WTO has set out 
internationally recognized obligations and objectives to 
protect the economic, social, and cultural rights of human 
beings.10 Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the United Nations 
from 1997 to 2006, himself has warned that the “failure to act 
on human rights . . . will undermine the credibility of the 
global trading system.”11 
 In international law, since the establishment of the 
United Nations (“the U.N.”) in 1945, human rights have been 
at the forefront of international geopolitical concern—in 
theory, if not in practice. The Preamble to Charter of the U.N. 
                                                 
 
 
8 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 
15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement]. 
9 Cephas Lumina, Free Trade or Just Trade? The World Trade Organisation, 
Human Rights, and Development (Part 1), 12 L., DEMOCRACY & DEV. 20, 26-
28 (2008) (defining fair trade as a regulating mechanism in trade that is 
formulated to achieve “justice” in economics, and defining free trade as a 
regulating mechanism in trade that concerns itself with achieving 
“justice” in human rights). 
10 Id. at 33. See also Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The WTO Constitution and 
Human Rights, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 19, 24 (2002). 
11 Lumina, supra note 9, at 28. 
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starts with the reaffirmation of “faith in fundamental human 
rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the 
equal rights of men and women and of nations large and 
small.”12 The body was established with an eye to “promote 
social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom”: 
to promote progress in human rights and establish long-
lasting institutions that would protect human rights.13 Going 
even further, when the 1948 U.N. General Assembly adopted 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”), it laid 
out that this hortatory declaration was understood to be “a 
common standard of achievements for all peoples and all 
nations.”14 
Where the protection of human rights has found most 
support has been in the international declarations, guiding 
principles, and general international law that have come after 
the U.N. and UDHR in the 1940s. One can argue that the 
                                                 
 
 
12 U.N. Charter preamble. 
13 Id.; See also id. art. 1-2 (elaborating on the purpose of the United Nations 
as an international body and the responsibilities and principles of its 
members in achieving this higher respect and protection of human rights); 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S 171 (entered into force March 23, 1976) (the 
covenant proposed by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights and adopted by the U.N. General Assembly defining humans’ civil 
and political rights and laying out the responsibilities of governments in 
the protection of these rights); International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 
3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) (the covenant proposed by the Office of 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights and adopted by the U.N. 
General Assembly defining humans’ economic, social, and cultural rights 
and laying out the responsibilities of governments in the protection of 
these rights). 
14 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 
1948). 
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UDHR itself has become customary international law in 
subsequent years; it encapsulates erga omnes obligations: 
“those obligations binding on all states and in whose 
observance all states have a legal interest.”15 First, this is 
underscored by the fact that human rights standards 
themselves seem to “have achieved the status of jus cogens”—
of “preemptory norm[s] of general international law”—
because of rather-recent international judicial opinions that 
underscore the incontrovertible primacy and irrefutability of 
human rights.16 Second, the erga omnes status of the UDHR 
finds support in the fact that experts in human rights, 
international law, and trade have recognized the 
responsibility of governments 1) to protect their citizens from 
mass atrocities (only if they cannot first prevent the mass 
atrocities) and 2) to help other states that do not have the 
capacity or willingness to do the same.17 Briefly, governments 
have a “responsibility to protect” (“R2P”).  
                                                 
 
 
15 See Lumina, supra note 9, at 31-32 (proposing that the principles in the 
UDHR are binding on any significant player in the international political 
economy). 
16 See id., supra note 9, at 34 n.83 (listing a few international judicial 
opinions from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights that 
have underscored the primacy of human rights); See also Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
(stating that treaties drafted in conflict with general international 
preemptory norms are void). 
17 Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: An Idea Whose Time has 
Come…and Gone?, 22 INT’L REL. 283, 285 (2008); Alex Bellamy, R2P – Dead 
or Alive?, in RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT – FROM EVASIVE TO RELUCTANT 
ACTION? 11, 15-16 (Malte Brosig ed., Hans Seidel Foundation, Institute for 
Security Studies, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, South African Institute of 
International Affairs 2012). 
306 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 25 
Gareth Evans, a key figure in the development and 
adoption of R2P as a principle, describes it as an international 
norm because it is a principle which touches on “our common 
humanity.”18 Indeed, the concept was unanimously adopted 
at the 2005 U.N. World Summit. For this reason, Evans 
believes it is a universal concept that supersedes states’ 
nationalistic, realpolitik interests; to a certain extent, he argues, 
it is or should be logically understood as an integral part of 
states’ nationalistic, realpolitik interests. Alex Bellamy, another 
key figure in the development of R2P, explains that as the 
norm becomes more central to the way the international 
community functions and responds to the challenges of 
human rights violations, its implementation in differing 
contexts becomes more and more complex.19 Nevertheless, or 
because of that very challenge of increasing complexity, R2P 
as a guiding principle for sovereign governance evolves, is 
strengthened, and moves to the forefront of the international 
conversation on law, policy, trade, and geopolitical and geo-
economical governance.20 Significantly, R2P rests 
fundamentally on customary and written international law; it 
is nothing new.21 
R2P finds an important extension in the U.N.’s 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. The very 
contents of the document are divided into “the state[’s] duty 
to protect human rights” and “the corporate responsibility to 
respect human rights”—and includes an “access to remedy” 
                                                 
 
 
18 Evans, supra note 17, at 298. 
19 Bellamy, supra note 17, at 13. 
20 Bellamy, supra note 17, at 22-24. 
21 Bellamy, supra note 17, at 16. 
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for parties whose rights have been violated.22 The extension 
of R2P into the realm of corporate responsibility is incredibly 
significant given that, generally, only states are responsible 
for their corporations’ extraterritorial violations of 
international human rights law.23 That is to say, given that 
“human rights treaty obligations are generally understood as 
falling on States only,”24 companies and corporations often 
escape liability for their international human rights 
violations. They cannot be tried in courts under international 
law.25 Thus, there is a gap in the jurisprudence of international 
courts. However, “economists increasingly emphasize the 
important role of legal institutions in economic growth,” 
giving the world of human rights hope that such institutions 
could have a profound, positive impact.26 
International trade, law, and human rights can be 
complimentary, and the growth of one helps, and in fact, 
directly leads to the growth of the other.27 There is 
                                                 
 
 
22 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, included in the final 
report to the Human Rights Council of the Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General, at iii, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (June 16, 2011). 
23 Robert McCorquodale and Penelope Simons, Responsibility beyond 
Borders: State Responsibility for Extraterritorial Violations by Corporations of 
International Human Rights Law, 70 MODERN L. REV. 598, 601 (2007). 
24 Frequently Asked Questions About the Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights, U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FAQ_PrinciplesBussi
nessHR.pdf.  
25 McCorquodale and Simons, supra note 23, at 598. 
26 Frank B. Cross, The Relevance of Law in Human Rights Protection, 19 INT’L 
REV. L. & ECON. 87, 88 (1999). 
27 See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights and International Trade Law: 
Defining and Connecting the Two Fields, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
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“foundational substance in international trade law that can be 
interpreted to support the protection of human rights.”28 This 
article sets out to demonstrate that both trade and law can 
work in tandem for the protection of human rights in every 
country around the world. 
The next section in the article will elaborate on the two-
pronged method of analysis for this study that will illuminate 
the ways in which trade and law can complement each other 
in the system of establishing human rights protections. 
II. METHOD OF ANALYSIS IN THE ARTICLE 
As this article comparatively investigates how trade 
regimes and legal regimes impact the protection of human 
rights,29 I will first conduct a purely statistical analysis 
tracking South Korea’s and South Africa’s trade regime 
growth and how it has affected their human rights outcome. 
                                                 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 29, 29-34 (Thomas Cottier, Joost Pauwelyn, & 
Elisabeth Bürgi, eds., 2005); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights, 
International Economic Law and “Constitutional Justice,” 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
769, 773 (2008). 
28 Abadir M. Ibrahim, International Trade and Human Rights: An Unfinished 
Debate, 14 HEINONLINE GER. L. J. 321, 331(2013). See also Cross, supra note 
26, at 95, for the proposition that “the presence of an express constitutional 
protection still has no significant effect on the actual protection of 
constitutional rights.” 
29 I limit my interpretation of “human rights” to the U.N.’s Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights’ interpretation: “rights inherent to 
all human beings, whatever our nationality, place of residence, sex, 
national or ethnic origin, color, religion, language, or any other status. . . . 
These rights are interrelated, interdependent and indivisible.” What Are 
Human Rights?, UNITED NATIONS OFF. OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR 
HUM._RTS.,_http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Pages/WhatareHuman
Rights.aspx (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
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I thus employ two variables for this analysis: an independent 
and a dependent variable. 30 The two variables will track the 
growth of trade in a country and the human rights outcome. 
The independent variable, representative of a 
country’s trade regime, is “trade agreements.” I use the World 
Trade Organization’s (“WTO’s”) definition of trade 
agreement for my study: “measures, policies, or laws” that a 
country enacts having to do with trade in and out of that 
country.31 This includes regional trade agreements (e.g., the 
North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement), multilateral trade 
agreements, and bilateral trade agreements the country has 
been involved in from 1995 to 2014, the WTO’s first eleven 
years of formal operation.32 
The dependent variable in this analysis is the country’s 
human rights record, representing the country’s human 
rights protection regime. I use Freedom House’s Freedom in 
the World report to measure this variable: I chose to employ 
                                                 
 
 
30 I include certain control variables in the analysis as well, but refrain from 
extensive explanation of the variables for the sake of clarity and space. 
These control variables are 1) regime type (democracy), 2) GDP per capita, 
percent annual growth, 3) GDP per capita, current USD, 4) labor unrest 
(strikes and lockouts), and 5) economic complexity. 
31 Trade Policy Reviews: Ensuring Transparency, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm11_e.ht
m (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
32 I operationalize “trade agreements” by drawing on records from the 
WTO and governments’ foreign affairs websites from the years 1995 to 
2014. The number inputted into my data set corresponds to the number of 
trade agreements in operation for the country in question at the specific 
year in time, noting that these are the agreements conducted outside of 
membership of the WTO. 
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the data set (along with its coding methods) for each country 
for the same time period: from 1995 to 2014.33 
I use a simple regression model because of the physical 
limits of this paper, but I argue that it is representative and 
foolproof enough to have its outcomes respected. A 
regression model correlates one set of data with another 
specified set of data, detailing the specific correlation that one 
can make between the two. The statistics of significance that 
it puts out are an x-variable coefficient, a P-value, and a lower 
and upper 95% confidence variable. The x-variable coefficient 
is the “slope” of the correlation, the mean, and thus it signifies 
how well the two sets of data in question can be correlated. 
The P-value denotes the percent of error from 100 for which 
you can say your data is accurate. The lower and upper 95% 
confidence variables are the two x-variable points between 
which 95% of the x-variable coefficient correlation lies.  
Using a simple regression analysis, I hope to find a 
negative correlation among the data. Specifically, the best 
                                                 
 
 
33 Specifically, I look at the score given for a country’s “civil liberties 
rating.” The Freedom House Freedom in the World data set defines a civil 
liberty as “freedoms of expression, assembly, association, education, and 
religion. [The state has] an established and generally fair legal system that 
ensures the rule of law . . . allow[s] free economic activity, and tend[s] to 
strive for equality of opportunity for everyone, including women and 
minority groups.” Methodology: Freedom in the World 2016, FREEDOM 
HOUSE,_https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-
2016/methodology (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). Using this definition, the 
analysts compiling the Freedom in the World report decide on “Civil 
Liberties Rating” by looking at news articles, academic analyses, reports 
from nongovernmental organizations, and individual professional 
contacts. The analyst then assigns a total score based on this information, 
ranging from 1 (“the greatest degree of freedom”) to 7 (“the smallest 
degree of freedom”). 
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outcome would be that the “human rights record” score 
decreases (i.e., protection of political rights and civil liberties 
improves) with an increase in the number of trade agreements 
a country signs on to. The negative correlation would signal 
that trade can be a proper vehicle to implement significant 
protections for human rights. 
After quantitatively evaluating South Africa and South 
Korea’s economic development and tracking it with each 
country’s human rights outcome, I move to qualitatively 
investigate the historical, economic, and social development 
of both countries. The purpose of moving to a second analysis 
is to complement the rather-limited statistical analysis I 
conduct in the first part of the paper. A more thorough 
discussion of these limitations is included below. Through the 
case study analysis, I will investigate each country’s history 
of economic development, trade relations, legal regime, 
governmental evolution, societal composition, and societal 
relations. I will “examine particular issues or phenomena in 
two . . . countries with the express intention of comparing 
their manifestations in different socio-cultural settings 
(institutions, customs, traditions, value systems, life styles, 
language, thought patterns), using the same research 
instruments.”34 This will allow me to extrapolate the results 
to other comparatively similar countries–with similar 
political, economic, and social conditions–and to draw 
significant policy and legal recommendations for those 
classes of countries. 
The next section in the article lays out the statistical 
outputs for South Africa and South Korea and the 
implications of these results for the rest of the study. 
                                                 
 
 
34 ALAN BRYMAN, SOCIAL RESEARCH METHODS 58 (3rd ed. 2008). 
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III. STATISTICAL OUTPUTS FOR SOUTH AFRICA AND SOUTH 
KOREA 
Figure 1 and 2 below tabulate the data collected for 
South Africa and South Korea, respectively, from 1995 to 
2014. 
 
Figure 1 South Africa 
Year Trade 
Agreeme
nts 
HR 
record 
Regime 
type 
GDP per 
capita, 
% 
annual 
growth 
GDP per 
capita, 
current 
USD 
Labor 
unrest 
Economi
c 
complexi
ty 
1995 2 2 1 0.89 3973.93 315 0.30 
1996 2 2 1 2.00 3690.18 901 0.34 
1997 2 2 1 0.28 3728.33 1324 0.38 
1998 2 2 1 -1.84 3288.20 527 0.41 
1999 4 2 1 -0.04 3183.15 107 0.37 
2000 6 2 1 1.65 3099.13 80 0.44 
2001 6 2 1 0.62 2705.78 83 0.04 
2002 6 2 1 2.25 2535.49 47 0.05 
2003 6 2 1 1.65 3799.44 62 0.16 
2004 6 2 1 3.21 4892.04 49 0.15 
2005 6 2 1 3.90 5444.08 102 0.13 
2006 6 2 1 4.17 5660.12 99 0.10 
2007 6 2 1 3.92 6153.66 75 0.14 
2008 8 2 1 1.75 5811.62 57 0.11 
2009 8 2 1 -2.94 5912.14 51 0.29 
2010 8 2 1 1.55 7389.96 74 0.25 
2011 8 2 1 1.69 8080.87 67 -0.18 
2012 8 2 1 0.68 7592.16 99 0.19 
2013 8 2 1 0.64 6889.79 114 0.32 
2014 8 2 1 -0.06 6482.82 88 .. 
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Figure 2 South Korea 
Year Trade 
Agreeme
nts 
HR 
record 
Regime 
type 
GDP per 
capita, 
% 
annual 
growth 
GDP per 
capita, 
current 
USD 
Labor 
unrest 
Economi
c 
complexi
ty 
1995 0 2 1 7.84 12403.91 88 0.99 
1996 0 2 1 6.17 13254.64 85 1.01 
1997 0 2 1 4.78 12196.77 78 0.97 
1998 0 2 1 -6.39 8133.73 129 0.94 
1999 0 2 1 9.95 10432.21 198 1.03 
2000 0 2 1 7.93 11947.58 250 1.09 
2001 0 2 1 3.75 11255.95 235 1.39 
2002 0 2 1 6.84 12788.58 322 1.46 
2003 1 2 1 2.42 14219.19 320 1.50 
2004 1 2 1 4.51 15921.94 462 1.63 
2005 4 2 1 3.71 18657.52 287 1.66 
2006 4 2 1 4.67 20917.03 138 1.64 
2007 4 2 1 4.97 23101.51 115 1.49 
2008 4 2 1 2.09 20474.89 108 1.49 
2009 5 2 1 0.23 18338.71 121 1.56 
2010 5 2 1 6.00 22151.21 86 1.64 
2011 7 2 1 2.91 24155.83 65 1.80 
2012 8 2 1 1.83 24453.97 105 1.70 
2013 8 2 1 2.46 25997.88 72 1.70 
2014 8 2 1 2.89 27970.50 111 .. 
 
Figure 3 tabulates the regression model outputs from the data. 
 
Figure 3 Regression model outputs 
Unit of 
Analysis 
X-
variable 
coefficient 
P-
value 
Lower 
95% 
Upper 
95% 
South 
Africa 
0 #NUM! 0 0 
South 
Korea 
0 #NUM! 0 0 
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Both South Africa and South Korea’s statistical outputs 
are incredibly significant, because the data shows that there is 
no correlation between the two variables–trade agreements 
and human rights record–whatsoever. That is to say, 
regardless of the number of free trade agreements that the 
government has entered into over the years, and despite the 
fluctuations in the control variables, each country’s human 
rights record has not changed. 
 Looking at South Africa, South Africa has maintained 
a constant, higher-than average human rights record as 
reported by Freedom House’s Freedom in the World Report (the 
average being 3.5, with ratings possible out of 1 to 7), despite 
the increasing number of free trade agreements since 1995. 
Below I list the control variables for further inspection: 
 CV1. According to Freedom House, South 
Africa has been considered an electoral 
democracy since 1995.  
 CV3. Its GDP per capita has almost doubled 
over the past 11 years (from $3973.93 to 
$6482.82).  
 CV4. The amount of labor unrest has 
significantly decreased from a high of 1324 in 
1997 to 88 strikes or lockouts reported in 2014. 
 CV5. And its economic complexity has 
remained virtually unchanged, with an average 
of 0.21 and a standard deviation of 0.16 over the 
11 years investigated.  
Given that these control variables do not quite explain 
the reason for South Africa’s 0 x-variable coefficient, I argue 
that more sophisticated quantitative data is needed to make a 
definitive study of the human rights situation in the country 
since the end of apartheid in 1994. For this reason, I will 
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conduct an investigation into the history of the country, its 
politics, its economic development, and the particular trade 
relations it has had since 1995, as reported by the WTO and 
other academic journals. I hope to discover the reasons why 
trade agreements have had no effect on the human rights 
outcomes of South African people. 
 Looking at South Korea, South Korea has remained 
relatively free with a constant, higher-than-average human 
rights record (the dependent variable) as reported by 
Freedom House’s Freedom in the World report (the average 
being 3.5, with ratings possible out of 1 to 7). When looking at 
the control variables, one can see that: 
 CV1. Regime type has remained constant – since 
1995, South Korea has been considered an 
electoral democracy. 
 CV3. GDP per capita has more than doubled: 
$12,403.91 in 1995 versus $27,970.50 in 2014. 
 CV4. The amount of labor unrest has fluctuated, 
with high variance, but went back down to a 
relatively low number in 2014 (111 strikes and 
lockouts), the average being 168.75 and the 
standard deviation 108.9939. 
 CV5. Economic complexity has remained 
somewhat the same, with an average of 1.41, 
and a standard deviation of 0.30. 
Because there is such significant variance in the control 
variables, I move to study South Korea in a qualitative 
analysis. Looking at the Republic of Korea’s history in the 20th 
century, trade activity since 1995 as reported by the WTO, and 
a variety of scholarly articles discussing the development of 
the economy and human rights norms in South Korea, I hope 
to find why the level of human rights protections in the 
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country has remained virtually unchanged over the past 11 
years. 
Generally, though the study’s results are illuminating, 
it is important to note that there is a rather significant 
limitation in this analysis, namely the lack of sophisticated 
quantitative human rights data. There exist many precedents 
with regards to quantifying human rights violations, but 
there are strides yet to be made within this particular 
practice.35 For this reason, the correlation between my 
independent and dependent variables is not entirely 
demonstrative. There is a great need for more sophisticated 
data, rather than just a whole number estimation of a “human 
rights record.” However, for reasons of time, scope, and 
feasibility, I was not be able to remedy this situation to any 
extent for my own study. On the other hand, qualitative 
studies, though less systematized, are necessary for a more 
dynamic understanding of “outlier” countries’ particular 
historical developments. The next section dives in to a greater 
analysis of these countries, using historical documents, legal 
documents, scholarly articles, and news reports. 
IV. QUALITATIVE CASE STUDIES, SOUTH AFRICA AND SOUTH 
KOREA 
This section will qualitatively analyze the social, 
economic, and legal development of South Africa and South 
Korea, respectively. The analysis will focus on attempting to 
reconcile the results of the quantitative analysis above—
showing no correlation between economic development and 
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growing protection for human rights—with each country’s 
complex historical and legal record.  
First, I begin with South Africa and then go on to study 
South Korea. Briefly, and without failing to acknowledge that 
much of the following was achieved after immense political 
and social strife, South Africa was colonized by the Dutch in 
1652, and was later forcibly taken over by the British in, 
officially, 1806. The British first created a nominally 
independent Union of South Africa in 1910; they then granted 
the nation full independence in 1931. South Korea, on the 
other hand, had always maintained independence since pre-
historic periods until it was occupied by Japan in 1910, after 
the First Sino-Japanese Wars of 1894 and 1895 and the Russo-
Japanese War of 1904 to 1905. Japan maintained control over 
the united country until it surrendered to Soviet and 
American forces at the end of World War II in 1945. 
Though the two countries achieved independence 
within, roughly, the same few decades, the historical contexts 
behind the reason for independence and the development 
after independence differ drastically. Furthermore, the 
development of the peoples themselves differs drastically as 
well. In South Korea, the Korean people had always 
maintained a sense of unity and homogeneity throughout 
Japanese occupation—and indeed, had maintained a sense of 
hostility against the Japanese. Contrastingly, the South 
African people had always been either formally or informally 
segregated along racial, ethnic, and economic lines: blacks, 
Afrikaners and whites had always been at odds. These 
differences between the two countries contribute to distinct 
ideologies, strategies for economic growth, models for social 
development, processes for legitimizing institutions, legal 
systems and so forth. These differences will be highlighted 
below and at the conclusion to the section. 
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A. SOUTH AFRICA, CASE STUDY 
South Africa achieved independence from Britain in 
1931, and soon thereafter the National Party took control of 
the government in 1948.36 This party formally adopted a 
policy of “apartheid”—separateness—that segregated the 
country into its different racial and ethnic groups: blacks, 
whites (Europeans), and Afrikaners (descendants from the 
mainly white Dutch settlers whose mother tongue is 
Afrikaans, a mix of a southern Dutch dialect, Indonesian, and 
other African tongues brought over by slaves from Indonesia 
and Madagascar). Apartheid, government-institutionalized 
segregation, led to an incredibly divisive and abusive public 
state of affairs that benefitted the white population at the 
expense of the black population. Whites enjoyed the highest 
standard of living in all of Africa, a standard comparable to 
the advanced Western societies, while the blacks were 
intensively disadvantaged in every sector: health, education, 
income, housing, et cetera. In all, the “system bred 
intolerance, a culture of violence, and lack of respect for life 
and, indeed, rights in general.”37 
Throughout apartheid, domestic national movements 
(e.g., the African National Congress, also known as the 
“ANC”), international movements through non-
governmental organizations (“NGOs”), and governments 
and populations from across the world criticized and 
oftentimes violently protested the South Africans’ policies.38 
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Indeed, many governments such as the United States also put 
in place heavy economic sanctions against South Africa in an 
effort to destabilize, or at the very least paralyze, the country’s 
economy. Because of this immense international pressure and 
vigilance which continued for a period of more than 40 years, 
the South African government began to negotiate with 
liberation movements over policies that would aid in the 
transition of the country to a democracy.39 
The process of transition began in 1990 when the 
Constitutional Assembly (the “CA”), made up of 490 elected 
members from the National Assembly and the Senate of 
South Africa, set out to draft a new constitution that would 
ensure public participation “to observe the democratic 
principles of openness and inclusiveness.”40 The amount of 
public participation achieved by the CA was commendable: 
“over 1.7 million submissions, mainly petitions, were 
received from citizens before a draft text was published . . . In 
the subsequent drafting phase, the CA received over 1500 
submissions and petitions.”41 The “Final Constitution” which 
entered into force on February 4, 1997 contains a Bill of Rights 
establishing certain political, socioeconomic, and children’s 
rights, as well as a basic, fundamental respect for human 
dignity.42 
Significantly, the Constitution is justiciable: the 
institution of the judiciary and its court system became 
empowered, by new constitutional mandate, to reach the 
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substantive merits of cases and evaluate the fairness of the 
law.43 Prior to the “Final Constitution,” judges had been seen 
as “mere technicians” who had the expertise only to ensure 
that procedure and technicalities were respected, while 
parliamentarians were the supreme voices of the substance 
and fairness of law.44 In particular, the establishment of the 
Constitutional Court in February 1995 signaled the end of 
parliamentary supremacy and the introduction of a true 
constitutional democracy to a degree that would ensure the 
respect of all constitutional human rights in all South African 
courts.45 What makes this empowerment additionally 
powerful is that the constitution outlines that the respect of 
socioeconomic rights applies to relations between the state 
and the citizen (a vertical protection) as well as between 
citizens themselves (a horizontal protection).46 This means 
that, in dealing with cases that directly implicate 
constitutional law, the Constitutional Court has the power to 
rule on government policy.47 Indeed, “[i]n the realm of overtly 
‘political’ cases, the . . . Court has shown itself to be eager to 
deliver decisions as quickly as possible,”48 and it “has shown 
itself to be both a libertarian court and one that is at ease, to 
some degree, with the job of striking down apartheid-era 
statutes.”49 Problematically however, the criminal justice 
system trails behind the Constitutional Court with regards to 
ensuring the protection of human rights. Failed prosecutions 
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have become the norm. It is a norm which “perpetuates a lack 
of respect . . . for the rule of law” and which threatens the 
judicial system in general.50 
Nevertheless, there is hope of accountability for South 
African courts and hope for the respect for human rights in 
two forms. First, the provisions in the Constitutional Bill of 
Rights inherently incorporate the international 
understanding of human rights as outlined in the U.N. 
Charter, the UDHR, the Marrakesh Agreement establishing 
the WTO, the ICCPR, and the ICESCR. The Final Constitution 
itself stipulates this specific relation between South African 
law and customary and institutional international law: 
“customary international law is law in the Republic unless it 
is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament. 
When interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer 
any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is 
consistent with international law over any alternative 
interpretation that is inconsistent with international law.”51 In 
other words, customary international law–international 
norms–is as lawful and legitimate in the domestic space as it 
is in the international stage of law, and no court can subvert 
this international law to the law of the Republic because both 
are complementary. This means that, in theory, South African 
courts will be held accountable to the international treaties 
onto which they signed. Second, there is hope for the respect 
for human rights because the South African Parliament itself 
has implemented several human rights institutions to deal 
with the social reformation of the South African people. These 
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include the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the 
Human Rights Commission, the Land Restitution 
Commission, the Public Protector, the Pan South African 
Language Board, and the Gender Commission.52 These 
provisions and institutions have been instrumental in 
successfully navigating the end and transition from apartheid 
to an era wherein a South African culture centered on human 
rights is fostered and promoted.53 
The Human Rights Commission in particular has 
“dedicated itself to . . . monitoring and assessing the 
observance of human rights . . . [and] addressing human 
rights violations” by helping citizens seek effective legal 
redress.54 It utilizes its “core operational programmes” to 
achieve these objectives, including the Legal Services 
Programme and the Research and Documentation 
Programme.55 The former operates on a basis of complaint-
filing by individual citizens; the program then investigates 
the complaints by conducting public inquiries and issuing 
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subpoenas, and it litigates in the instances where mediation 
and negotiation fail.56 It produces a Trends Analysis Report 
on an annual basis to “provide [to Parliament and the general 
public] statistical information regarding the number of 
complaints received, referred, and finalized by the 
Commission [and] . . . a narrative analysis” accompanying the 
statistics.57 
Over the past six years, beginning in the 2012-13 fiscal 
year, the number of complaints and enquiries (“cases”) has 
averaged to 8,888.25 per year.58 The fiscal year for 2015-16 has 
had the most number of cases since the 2011-12 fiscal year 
(9,238 versus 11,363, respectively).59 The highest number of 
complaints in the 2015-16 fiscal year—749 complaints, 16.06% 
of total complaints—came from the category of the human 
right to equality.60 The same holds true for 2014-15, though 
the number of complaints is considerably lower: there were 
493 complaints of violations in the category of the human 
right to equality, 13.19% of the total number of complaints for 
the fiscal year.61 The commission signals and emphasizes that 
a significant number of complaints relate to the alleged 
violation of the right to equality and that this number has 
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been increasing over the past five to six years.62 The 
commission further notes the following: 
Despite the enactment of legislation [and the 
codification of every citizen’s right to equality in Section 9(2), 
9(3), 16(1), and 16(2) of the South African constitution], there 
remain a number of considerable challenges in respect of the 
achievement of equality in South Africa. Inequality and 
discrimination remain a significant challenge to our 
democracy. According to the Gini coefficient, as well as other 
inequality measures, South Africa ranks as one of the most 
unequal countries in the world. These disparities are largely 
attributed to apartheid and its discriminatory laws and 
practices.63 
There is general consensus among scholars and 
researchers in the field that the South African “inequality is 
both a cause and consequence of the lack of enjoyment of 
social and economic rights.”64 Most notably, “poverty and 
inequality stand together, and they have a racial quality” that 
stems from the long history of racial, ethnic, and gender 
discrimination that was institutionally perpetuated in South 
Africa for decades.65 Constitutional provisions seem to have 
no traction against “half a century of post-apartheid political 
leadership [that] has largely failed to change land and capital 
ownership patterns, or bridge the huge socioeconomic divide 
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that is still predicated on race.”66 It was known from the 
outset that the post-apartheid political leadership and the 
corruption that ran rampant through that leadership 
structure would be a mountainous road block for realizing 
true change in the culture of human rights.67 However, apart 
from the contemporary “kleptocrat president” and his 
“depredations on the public purse,” today’s social tensions 
also rise from “starving students living in crowded 
circumstances and saddled with mounting debt,” the poor 
living in townships who have never been able to take part in 
the public infrastructure projects, the poor who have been 
able to take advantage of government housing but who have 
been left abandoned and devoid of opportunity in crumbling 
structures on the outer rims of developed cities, and the “most 
privileged in . . . society [who] persistently refuse to 
acknowledge that their continuing privilege was achieved at 
the expense of the dignity and wellbeing of their 
compatriots.”68 
The country has made much progress in its human 
rights achievement, but continued progress forward must be 
dictated by government policies and legal precedent that 
would reconcile social frustrations. On the whole, the 
demarcation between those who have and those who do not 
have is endemic. This is perpetuated by the government. This 
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demarcation seems insurmountable as it looms over all of 
society, the root of violent protests that have been crippling 
the country and threatening the stability of the legal system. 
In short, structural apartheid persists, and the law in South 
Africa has not lived up to its expectation. 
B. SOUTH KOREA, CASE STUDY 
From 1910 and throughout World War II, the Japanese 
occupied Korea. Upon Japan’s surrender in 1945 to the Allied 
Forces, Korea was divided at the 38th parallel, with the Soviet 
troops occupying the northern half of the country and 
American troops occupying the southern half.69 This 
temporary line of division was selected somewhat arbitrarily, 
because it did not conform to how the people saw themselves 
organized politically, culturally, historically, or 
traditionally.70 But with the development of the Cold War, 
however, the two halves of the country developed 
independently and along very different lines. The 
independent Republic of Korea (South Korea) was 
proclaimed in 1948, sparking the brutal three-year Korean 
War, pitting the Chinese-backed North Koreans, against the 
South Koreans, backed by the United Nations. The war never 
officially ended; an armistice temporarily calling off fighting 
was signed only by North Korea in 1953. Throughout this 
period, South Korea had been significantly backed by the 
United States which had shipped over economic, military, 
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and political support. By the stalling of the war in 1953, the 
whole country and nation of South Korean people was 
ravaged almost to obliteration. There was a pressing need to 
consolidate political power and create a platform and strategy 
for massive economic development. 
South Korea adopted an essentially democratic 
constitution in 1948 when it proclaimed itself a republic. But 
the constitution was abolished in 1960 when President 
Sygnman Ree stepped down in response to massive student 
uprisings calling electoral fraud.71 The people saw President 
Ree’s government as a civic dictatorship that was forcibly 
anti-communist and anti-democratic. The student uprisings 
fueled the success of a military coup on May 16, 1961, which 
established General Park Jung Hee as the head of state for the 
Republic of Korea. Despite being a military dictatorship, 
General Park declared a Third Republic in December 1963 
and held elections for a new civilian government. After 
General Park won the election, he implemented a third 
constitution and simultaneously implemented programs for 
massive industrial development.72 
The resultant rapid economic growth and proliferation 
of government policies aimed at supporting the growth 
“undoubtedly had spill-over effects in improving the quality 
of life of the people.”73 The President of the Korea 
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Development Institution at the time, Mahn Je Kim, wrote “the 
Park government realized economic development as the key 
to its own political success as well as to the establishment of 
political stability and . . . the means for overcoming 
negativism and frustration in the country.”74 
At a minimum, increased economic production 
provided Koreans with the opportunity to gain employment, 
transferable production skills, improved communication 
(e.g., telecommunications, roads, highways), access to 
education, and greater individual economic welfare. Annual 
population rates slowed because there was a decrease in 
mortality and birth rates; these declines were in turn 
associated with “better sanitation, public health services, and 
medical care in the case of death rates, and, for birth rates, 
with successful population planning programs and with 
development.”75  
Additionally, this rapid growth in economic 
production did not mean the typical rift in income inequality. 
Poverty levels decreased as a whole, though not 
entirely.“[E]vidence of relatively limited public expenditure 
for social and welfare purposes . . . indicate that redistributive 
fiscal policy [was not] important in curbing inequality.”76 In 
1982, South Korea spent much less than Japan and 
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considerably less than Taiwan in housing amenities, social 
security, and welfare: 10.5% compared to 12.6% and 32.5%, 
respectively. This can be attributed to a substantial decrease 
in labor surplus in the 1960s and 1970s, which led to real wage 
increases that most greatly benefited those “at the bottom end 
of the income scale.”77 
Despite the increase in economic power, the South 
Korean people had little opportunity to demand better 
human rights. After the period of rapid economic 
development, people lost freedom and democracy because of 
the persistence of the authoritarian military government in 
South Korea until 1992, tightly controlling everything from 
working hours, to children’s education, to housing 
arrangements based on workplace.78 In the late 1980s, South 
Koreans still saw widespread violation of human rights, the 
proliferation of government corruption, and the suppression 
of the opposition to government rule.79 However, with the 
rapid economic growth came a promising rapid growth in the 
growing middle class’s sensitivity towards human rights; 
they “tasted freedoms economically [and] began to press for 
widened freedoms politically.” 80 In other words, this new 
middle class was “acquiring an economic stake in political 
stability,” and would use that stake to influence the political 
situation that was becoming increasingly intolerable. From 
the government’s perspective, this crisis of rising 
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expectations, when coupled with the assassination of General 
Park in 1979 and the political vacuum of instability that 
followed, proved to be a momentous challenge.  
Scholars argue that the Olympic Games of 1988 became 
a government tool to legitimize power over the South Korean 
people in the eyes of the world. The government entered a bid 
to host the 1988 Olympics in Seoul for multiple purposes. 
First, the government sought to use the opportunity to bolster 
its image of economic superiority, and display the South 
Korean economic miracle to the world.81 Second, winning a 
bid for the Games would legitimize the government in the 
eyes of the world and serve as protection from North Korea.82 
In effect, the increased scrutiny in the country from 
international press and the increase in pressure from Korean 
citizens for a change in political status had a “signal effect on 
the pace and peacefulness of the transition” to a democratic 
state.83 The Seoul Olympics were not the cause of 
democratization and political change in South Korea, but it 
certainly made all conditions for transition “ripe.”84  
The political and legal situation in South Korea began 
to change before and during the Olympics, and had its most 
dramatic change in 1992 when the military dictatorship 
officially ended. The new millennium ushered in a new era 
for South Korea: President Kim Dae-Jung was awarded the 
Nobel Peace Prize in 2000; Foreign Minister Ban Ki-Mon was 
appointed the Secretary General of the United Nations in 
2006; South Korea concluded a free-trade deal with the United 
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States in 2007; and South Koreans elected their first female 
president, Park Geun-hye, in 2012.85 The Constitution, as 
amended in 1987, outlined the “rights and duties of citizens” 
with regards to their dignity; pursuit of happiness; equality; 
personal liberty; integrity; freedom of occupation, privacy, 
religion, speech, press, and assembly; intellectual rights; and 
the right to vote, education, work, environment, housing, and 
health.86 Similar to the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of Korea 
guarantees that “treaties duly concluded and promulgated 
under the Constitution and generally recognized rules of 
international law shall have the same force and effect of law 
as domestic laws of the Republic of Korea.”87 Though current 
international norms maintain “persuasive authority” over 
Korean society and Korean courts of law,88 the constitutional 
recognition of the legitimacy and enforceability of customary 
international law will prove significant to the exercise of 
judicial activism that has recently developed in South Korea 
and, generally, to the development of the democratic legal 
system in coming years.89 Coupled with the codification of the 
supremacy of human rights, “[t]he making of the [South 
Korean] Constitution . . . was a historic event, for it restored 
political independence formally, while introducing a 
democratic form of government for the first time in Korean 
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history.”90 The constitution allowed the government to 
legitimize itself in the eyes of the world. Though it would take 
a few decades to achieve the theoretical democracy and 
protection of human rights laid out in the constitution after 
the Park period ended, 
it must be stressed that the Korean legal system, 
as fraught with rampant political persecution 
and human rights violations as it was, did not, 
by any stretch, amount to an immoral legal 
order mired in genocide, slavery, racial 
discrimination, or the impudence of military 
dictatorship waging a so-called dirty war 
during which a massive number of people 
disappeared.91 
Indeed, the legal system struggled daily to maintain 
the minimum amount of due process throughout that period 
of most repressive authoritarian governmental rule.92 At the 
end of the day, the “preservation by the courts of the basic 
framework of legality” was essential to the transition of South 
Korea to a democracy in 1987.93 
Therefore, the most recent trend in South Korean 
jurisprudence of focusing on substantive justice—the merits 
of the law and of cases presented to the courts—rather than 
legal procedural formalities is ironic. The Supreme Court and 
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Constitutional Court have undertaken significant efforts to 
undo much of the allegedly “legal” constitutional precedent 
set in the 1960s and 1970s that came from strict adherence to 
legal formalities.94 For example, in 2010 and 2013, both courts 
each declared unconstitutional all Park-regime emergency 
decrees, thereby setting aside all decisions rendered between 
1974 and 1979 based on those decrees.95 Specifically, the 
Courts emphasized in these contemporary decisions how 
they see the courts of law “as the last bastion for the protection 
of basic rights.”96 It was therefore imperative to undo 
precedent that would prevent the courts of law from 
protecting the basic rights of citizens harmed.97  
More ironically, “these decisions . . . [corroborate] the . 
. . claim that the people, the holder of pouvoir constituant, can 
disregard the individual constitutional laws at will.”98 This 
exposed the courts to criticism, but there is scholarship that 
also understands the relationship of constitution and people 
as one of mutual benefit, “reflexivity,” and mutual creation.99 
That is to say, the amorphous, abstract entity of “the people” 
does not merely create the constitution from the norms and 
societal values that it holds. More so, the constitution gives 
the people their very identity because the “making of a 
constitution has the effect of calling a ‘people’ into 
existence.”100 The people, therefore, must play an active role 
in determining which constitutional provisions the legal and 
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social system must disregard or demarcate. Their “political 
and legal identity[, being] grounded in that very constitution” 
must be reflected by the constitution.101 This provides support 
for the recent trend towards “constitutionalism” that South 
Korean courts have been undertaking. Nevertheless, the role 
of the courts and “how [they] fare in the post-democratization 
era” is still a live question and a relevant question to the 
continued history of development in the country.102 
South Korean courts have felt the difficulty in finding 
the delicate balance that must be struck between too much 
emphasis on legal formalities and the rule of law and too 
much emphasis on natural law and human rights. “To strike 
out against the tide [raises] the specter of futility; to swim 
with the tide [raises] that of complicity;”103 and thus the courts 
must find a middle ground between the public desire for 
righteousness and justice and the substantive due process of 
the rule of law.104 They are in a unique position, straddling 
two exceedingly divergent eras of governmental rule and 
social realities, and trying to find the median fertile ground 
on which to defend, vis-à-vis the government and civil society, 
the basic guarantee of protections for human rights codified 
in Article 10 of the 1987 Constitution: “All citizens shall be 
assured of human dignity and worth and have the right to 
pursue happiness. It shall be the duty of the State to confirm 
and guarantee the fundamental and inviolable human rights 
of individuals.”105 
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C. CONCLUSIONS ON THE CASE STUDIES 
This section analyzed South African and South Korean 
legal systems in the context of each respective country’s 
historical, political, economic, and social development to 
supplement the quantitative findings of the previous section. 
Quantitatively, no correlation was found between growing 
economic power (trade agreements) and growing human 
rights protections. The qualitative analyses enlightened these 
results by showing the contemporary complexities in South 
African and South Korean society. Both countries underwent 
unique periods of transition in the 1980s and 1990s that would 
dictate progress, or lack thereof, in the following decades. In 
other words, both countries’ government history has proved 
problematic to the development of sophisticated, trusted legal 
systems. Nevertheless, reforms in the respective constitutions 
and respective Supreme and Constitutional Courts, as well as 
heavy international attention and academic scholarship, give 
promising hope for the future that human rights protections 
will continue to be prioritized and that repressive, oppressive 
past policies will plummet. 
V. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
This article was meant to study how well trade regimes 
and legal systems fare in the protection of human rights in 
South Africa compared with South Korea. The first half of the 
article developed a quantitatively analytical study that 
tracked the growth of South Africa’s and South Korea’s trade 
regime measured against each country’s measurement for 
human rights protections. The study was inconclusive; the 
analysis put forth an x-coefficient of 0, meaning there was no 
correlation between how these countries developed 
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economically and how their human rights outcomes changed 
because of the economic development. 
Because of this statistical aberration, I undertook a 
qualitative analysis in the second half of the article to study 
the historical development of each country, looking at the 
most recent history of political reform, economic 
development, social change, and legal restructuring. The 
results of the qualitative analysis proved more enlightening: 
for both South Africa and South Korea, deep-seeded 
government mistrust, social inequalities, and historical legal 
ineffectiveness and inefficiency pose important contemporary 
challenges to the protection of human rights. 
For South Africa specifically, the government and its 
institutions must address the ubiquitous and grave social 
tensions that are currently pushing civil society to the brink 
of a rift reminiscent of the dark days of apartheid. By 
remedying the social disunity currently pervading everyday 
life, the government will realize the same human rights 
protections ensured by the 1994 Constitution, those which 
make the Rainbow Nation famously inclusive and its 
constitution exemplary. In fact, constitutionalism may prove 
to be the “mechanism for balancing this requirement of unity 
with the unavoidable diversity of interests, values, and 
cultures [of black, Afrikaans, and white] that pervade” the 
South African society.106 For South Korea, the government 
must allow the high courts to effectively rule over precedent 
from its own dark era under the authoritarian dictatorship of 
General Park, and the courts must do so in a way that balances 
                                                 
 
 
106 Chaihark Hahm & Sung Ho Kim, To Make We the People: Constitutional 
Founding in Postwar Japan and South Korea, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 800, 812 
(2010). 
2018 DOES INTERNATIONAL TRADE TRUMP HUMAN RIGHTS 337 
society’s cry for substantive justice with the legal formalities 
of rule of law and due process: “the unity presupposed by a 
constitutional order is never static. It is a product of ceaseless 
dialogue.”107 Additionally, the academic world must continue 
to author studies investigating this development of legal 
human rights protections in South Korea; the field needs more 
analysis and the South Korean people’s cry for increased 
democracy and human rights protections needs international 
attention. 
Further, international institutions have a role to play in 
ensuring that these countries, and all countries party to 
international treaties focusing on human rights and trade, 
actualize their obligations, responsibilities, and promises 
under the treaties. Though international organizations lack 
police power, the collective power of its party members is a 
useful tool to effect positive change in human rights 
obligations across the world. Such organizations and 
coordinated party-member action paralyzed the South 
African economy during apartheid in the mid-20th century 
and helped South Koreans push for greater democratic 
freedoms at the end of the 20th century. There is much 
unrealized international power in these bodies; and it is a 
power which can be easily utilized to achieve goals in the area 
of human rights and economic development that all countries 
party to them want to achieve. 
Trade is a mechanism for achieving equalized social 
interactions if properly and constructively channeled. Trade 
is essential to the protection of human rights because “trade 
assists countries and people to meet the livelihood supplies” 
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that embody economic, social, and cultural rights.108 
Importantly, the growth of trade opportunities and profits 
must be complemented by an effective legal system which 
would be the ultimate champion and defender of every 
human’s most basic rights. The first steps towards remedying 
the social status quo must come from the executive; the 
process must be safeguarded by the judiciary; and the 
perpetuation of profit can be ensured by a happy, protected, 
productive populace. There is an “indirect but inherent 
linkage between [all three of] them,” and South Africa and 
South Korea are in a unique position to capitalize on the 
benefits of each.109  
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